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ABSTRACT: In July 1943, Wilder Penfield, an internationally renowned Cana-
dian neurosurgeon, led a high-profile group of Anglo-American surgeons in a
3-week tour of Soviet medical facilities and battlefield hospitals. This venture
paved the way for other medical missions, both Allied and Soviet, and the com-
munication of medical information. This was followed by a mission to China,
to provide assistance to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The most impor-
tant connection was, however, between Western medical scientists and their
counterparts in the Soviet Union, a relationship that lasted until the advent of
the Cold War. In this paper the exchange is examined, and it is argued that the
surgical mission was a major catalyst in the creation of an extensive system of
wartime medical interchange, which inspired hope for future cooperation in the
postwar world.
THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE of medical re-
search during the twentieth century has been
strongly affected by political factors, despite
the inherent humanitarian and internation-
alist values associated with medical knowl-
edge. These restrictions have been particu-
larly pronounced between medical doctors in
the Soviet Union and their counterparts in
Canada, Britain, and the United States. This
paper is concerned with a unique period of
cooperation during the Second World War,
which was exemplified by several Anglo-
American medical missions to the Soviet
Union. The first of these was a July 1943
surgical mission that included Canada's
Wilder Penfield.
In many ways, Penfield was admirably
suited for scientific liaison. Born and edu-
cated in the United States, he pursued post-
graduate studies in physiology with Sir
Charles Sherrington at Oxford University
before returning to his chosen professional
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vocation-neurosurgery. Even as a young
surgeon, Penfield's talents in this field were
outstanding, and in 1934 he was named di-
rector of the newly established Montreal
Neurological Institute at McGill University,
a position he held for the next 26 years.
During his long scientific career, Penfield es-
tablished an outstanding international repu-
tation, earning "an undisputed place among
the great neurosurgeons and neurologists of
all time" (Eccles and Feindel 1978 :473).
BACKGROUND
Prewar Western-Soviet medical coopera-
tion began with the International Congress of
Physiology in 1935. Held in Moscow and
Leningrad, this meeting involved over 1000
Soviet and large numbers of Western medical
scientists. From the Kremlin's perspective, or
at least from that of the prointernationalist
faction led by Nicholai Bukharin, the Con-
gress showed off Soviet medical achievements
to a generally admiring group of Western
doctors, who welcomed opportunities to re-
new contact with their Soviet counterparts.
For a time there was considerable optimism
about the possibilities of collaborative re-
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search. However, this euphoria soon passed.
By 1939, relations were disrupted by three
major events: the ferocious debate between
the pseudoscientific views of T. D. Lysenko
and leading Russian "Westernized" geneti-
cists; the Stalinist purge of political and sci-
entific dissenters; and the Ribbintrop-Molo-
tov Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939,
with its accompanying Soviet aggression.
Moreover, during the first 2 years of the war,
the USSR, as an ally of Nazi Germany was
by definition an enemy of the British Com-
monwealth. Although this situation changed
dramatically in June 1941 when Germany
invaded Russia, it was not until the Battle of
Stalingrad in November 1942 that the West-
ern Allies accepted the USSR as a valued
partner in the war against fascism (Kre-
mentsov 1997, Avery 1998).
As is well known, the Second World War
transformed the role of the scientist, leading
to the development of such new weapons as
radar, the proximity fuse, chemical and bio-
logical munitions, and above all, the atomic
bomb. In addition, however, there were
many military medical projects designed to
save lives and improve battlefield effective-
ness. In Canada, these undertakings were co-
ordinated by the federal government's Na-
tional Research Council (NRC), which acted
as the liaison between Canada's armed forces
and university and industrial scientists.
Wilder Penfield's involvement in military
research can be traced to his membership in
the NRC's committees for medical research
and aviation medicine, created in 1938 and
1939, respectively. He also took an active
role as president of the Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Canada in mobi-
lizing doctors behind the war effort. In June
1940, he wrote to its 600 members, urging
them to use their contacts with American
doctors to help bring the United States into
the war. "In any letter," he suggested, "do
not adopt a defeatist attitude. Point out that
we feel here that Britain can defend herself
with the help of the Dominions and can hold
the sea. If the United States will join the rest
of the English-speaking world without too
great a delay the war can be won and an in-
ternational police force established capable
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of guaranteeing peace and freedom to those
people who desire it" (Lewis 1981 : 165).
However, Penfield's most important con-
tribution was in his capacity as director of
the Montreal Neurological Institute, which in
short order transferred its research to mili-
tary-related subjects. The MNI's work was
particularly important in the fields of avia-
tion medicine, motion studies, night vision,
bums and plastic surgery, neurosurgery and
neuropsychiatry, and injuries of the nervous
system. Penfield also emerged as a key inter-
mediary between the NRC and leading Brit-
ish medical mandarins, notably Sir Henry
Dale and A. V. Hill of the Royal Society;
and Edward Mellanby, secretary of the
Medical Research Council, a connection re-
inforced by a 2-month personal mission to
Britain in July-August 1941. This was made
possible by two factors: Penfield convinced
C. J. Mackenzie, acting president of the
NRC, that Canadian military medicine re-
quired direct access to the latest British re-
search; and Dale and Mellanby requested his
presence (Penfield 1941a).
Overall, Penfield completed 54 reports on
the state of British defense medicine: some
complimentary, others, critical. Sensing that
few Ottawa bureaucrats would have the in-
clination or ability to understand his analy-
sis, he wrote a precis outlining his findings,
which he delivered personally to Mackenzie.
In addition, he sent a copy to Dr. A. N.
Richards, chairman of the U.S. Committee
on Medical Research (CMR), a branch of
America's powerful Office of Scientific Re-
search and Development (OSRD), even be-
fore Canadian officials had officially cleared
the document for circulation (Penfield
194Ib). This contact with Richards assumed
great importance in January 1943, when
Penfield approached the OSRD for an even
more ambitious medical adventure: namely,
a joint Canadian-British-American surgical
mission to the Soviet Union, with himself as
the sole Canadian representative.
THE SURGICAL MISSION: JULY-AUGUST 1943
The most important factor leading to the
creation of the Moscow mission was the
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willingness of Soviet leaders to allow Western
medical scientists into their country. There
were many reasons why the Kremlin altered
its previous policies of exclusion, but the
most important was its recognition that the
Red Army desperately needed Allied scien-
tific, technological, and medical assistance;
and that any effective exchange system re-
quired close cooperation between Western
and Russian scientists. The internal ram-
ifications of this apparent rapprochement
meant a temporary decline in the Communist
Party's control over the Soviet Academy of
Sciences and its research institutes, thus
facilitating the reemergence of many of the
country's leading scientists into positions of
influence. These included Leon Orbelli, di-
rector of the Institute of Evolutionary Physi-
ology in Leningrad; Vasili Parin, director of
the Maxim Gorky All-Union Institute of
Experimental Medicine (VIEM) and vice-
commissioner of public health; and Dr.
Propper Graschenko, director of the Institute
for Investigation of the Nervous System.
Another important factor was the appoint-
ment of two Soviet medical liaison officials,
Professors Vladimir Lebedenko and Ivan
Sarkisov in Washington, D.C., and London,
respectively, who were given instructions to
lobby for medical assistance from the Amer-
ican and British governments (Krementsov
1997).
Significantly, Penfield was among the first
to be informed of this change in Kremlin
policy. On 1 January 1943, he received a
telegram from Dr. Propper Graschenko, who
had visited the MNI in 1937: would Penfield
take the lead in organizing an Allied medical
mission to Moscow? While Penfield pon-
dered, officials of the U.S. embassy in Mos-
cow informed Washington that the Soviets
needed information about specific problems,
such as the treatment of bums caused by
phosphorus incendiary weapons and lewisite
poison gas. The embassy also indicated that
Soviet doctors wanted to see Western medi-
cal periodicals that had been excluded from
their country since the purges of the 1930s
(Stettinius 1943a).
By March 1943, plans for an Anglo-
American-Canadian surgical mission to
Moscow were well advanced. These were
based on the expectation that an exchange of
information would help both sides deal better
with battlefield injuries and provide a basis
for future cooperation. Penfield assumed an
important role, through his contact with A.
N. Richards and also in convincing E. R.
Stettinius Jr., director of the U.S. Office of
Lend Lease Administration, whom he visited
in Washington. To ensure that Stettinius got
the message, Penfield reiterated his argu-
ments in a letter: "I suggest that the (first
mission) going to Russia should be made up
largely of surgeons rather than other types of
medical scientists (with the possible addition
of an epidemiologist and a distinguished
physiologist) for the following reasons: The
... enormous numbers of casualties in Russia
must mean that they can teach us much.... It
also means that combining our knowledge
with theirs would certainly result in the sav-
ing of many Russian lives and eventually
lives in Allied theaters of war the world
over. . .. In regard to phosphorous bums,
thermal bums, and the general surgical prac-
tice in war-time, direct discussion is the only
way of giving mutual assistance of laying
plans for further research" (Penfield 1943a).
Stettinius was sufficiently impressed with
Penfield's grasp of the situation that he rec-
ommended that "if direct negotiations be-
tween medical men here and in the Soviet
Union are started, it will be difficult to find a
more qualified person than Dr. Penfield to
participate in activity on this side " (Stetti-
nius 1943b). The possibility that Penfield
might represent both Canadian and Ameri-
can defense medicine was short-lived, once
nationalist sensibilities and "security" con-
siderations entered into the equation. Never-
theless, by May 1943, Penfield was on his
way to Moscow, along with six prominent
surgeons: Lt. Col. Loyal Davis of the OSRD,
Colonel Elliott Cutler of the U.S. Army,
Rear Admiral Gordon-Taylor of the U.S.
Navy, and three British representatives,
Major-General D. C. Monro and Reginald
Watson-Jones of the Army and E. Rock
Carling of the Medical Research Council.
Once in Russia, during the next 3 weeks
Penfield and his colleagues kept up a frantic
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pace, vlsltmg research institutes and hospi-
tals. These visits were described at length in
his final report, dated October 1943.
Five important themes emerge from this
document. One of the most controversial,
which challenged previous Allied assess-
ments, was Penfield's claim that Soviet war
surgery was "well organized, efficient, mod-
ern" (1943b: 12), despite the staggering casu-
alty level of 6 million, with "70% of the in-
jured ... to have returned to the fighting
line" (1943b: 24). He also pointed out that
"psychoneurosis is rare ... for they have
an enormous supply of its specific antidote,
i.e., high morale manufactured in Russia"
(1943b: 54). A second theme considered the
triad approach to battlefield casualties: evac-
uation from front lines within 4-5 hours,
basic treatment at mobile hospitals within 36
to 48 hours, and movement to hospitals
specializing in thoracic or joint and limb in-
juries, anaerobic infections, and neurosurgery.
Given his background, Penfield was most
interested in Russian neurosurgical tech-
niques, and he spent considerable time with
Lt. General and Chief Surgeon Nikolai Bur-
denko, who, in addition to his administrative
duties, had direct responsibility for 7000
neurosurgical beds (Penfield 1943b). Al-
though he acknowledged Burdenko's ele-
vated position within the Soviet hierarchy,
Penfield was less impressed by his surgical
techniques, which he labeled "30 years out of
date," an observation he wisely confined to
his diary (Lewis 1981: 95).
Officially, Penfield politely noted the roles
played by the other Soviet medical bureau-
crats, while reserving his greatest praise for
the outstanding medical scientists he met
during his tour. These included his former
MNI associate, neurosurgeon Propper Gra-
schenko; Sergei Yudin, "a brilliant" gastro-
intestinal surgeon; and Lena Stern, the only
woman in the Soviet Academy of Science,
whose novel experiments with tetanus and
shock treatment greatly impressed him (Pen-
field 1943b: 44). These contacts reinforced his
view that Russian defense medicine had
much to offer the West, and his report
stressed the importance of gaining greater
access to Russian medical innovations.
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High on his list of vital information was
the Red Army's treatment of severe frostbite,
which included rapid heating and early in-
cisions "so as to lessen tension and hasten
separation of necrotic tissue." Other Soviet
success stories included an efficient blood
transfusion system, with the use of blood
substitutes, especially serum for shock and
hemorrhage; radical surgical wound excision
with closure, followed by complete immobi-
lization in plaster; and the effective system of
rapid air evacuation of soldiers with head in-
juries from the front lines. He also noted that
Russian scientists had made some headway
in developing the new wonder antibiotic-
penicillin.
However, Penfield's concluding comments
were pessimistic. He observed, for instance,
that there was "no free, informing exchang-
ing of visits" between the mission and Soviet
doctors "for fear of official criticism," and
that the Russian media had totally ignored
the presence of the mission. This aloofness,
he concluded, reflected two factors: that So-
viet leaders were still not ready to commit
themselves to extensive medical and scientific
cooperation with their Western allies; and
bitterness over the fact that 80% of Ger-
many's military effort was being directed
against Russia, despite the recent Allied in-
vasion of North Africa. By 21 July, Penfield
was ready to leave Moscow, with its omni-
present bureaucracy and restrictions, for his
next adventure. He had made many new
friends and was pleased that Russian neuro-
surgeons were aware of the many achieve-
ments of the MNI. He also believed that the
mission had made a significant contribution
in furthering cooperation between Russia
and the West (Lewis 1981: 180).
Penfield's sense of satisfaction was further
enhanced by his 2-week whirlwind tour of
Free China, as a guest of the Chiang Kai-
shek government. Because of the precarious
military situation, most of his time was spent
in Chungking, where he met General OdIum,
acting Canadian ambassador, and Dr. Rob-
ert McClure, a United Church medical mis-
sionary who greatly facilitated his tour of
Chinese hospitals. The high point of his visit,
however, was his personal audience with
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Chiang and his influential wife, an encounter
that left him convinced that "no one in
China doubts the integrity and ability of the
Generalissimo," whose role in the struggle
against the Japanese he equated with "very
like that of George Washington during the
long years of the American revolution"
(Penfield 1943c: 2).
Although Penfield may have been naive,
his assessment of China's medical resources
was more critical. He noted, for example, the
logistical problem of having "less than 10%
of the medical officers ... qualified doctors"
(Lewis 1981: 180) and "the overwhelming
need for drugs and supplies" (Penfield
1943c: 2) to cope with the enormous numbers
of battlefield casualties. Even more serious
was the fact that most Chinese deaths were
caused by malnutrition and infectious dis-
ease, particularly malaria, despite efforts by
British and Canadian mission hospitals to
cope with the problem. Nor was he optimistic
that the Western Allies could do much to
improve the situation: "The Chinese Army
Medical Service, like the Chinese Army, will
continue to conduct its part of the war in its
own way regardless of foreign opinion. In-
terference might be as unwise as it would be
useless" (Penfield 1943c: 7, 18).
Significantly, Penfield's China report had
no immediate impact upon either the Cana-
dian government or its allies (Penfield
1943c). For Ottawa, Washington, and Lon-
don, the Chinese theater was of marginal in-
terest in 1943, particularly when compared to
the Eastern Front, where the Red Army,
after the Battle of Stalingrad, had begun its
march toward Berlin.
THE LEGACY OF THE SURGICAL MISSION TO
RUSSIA
For Penfield, the Russian mission had
been a great personal success, and he thor-
ougWy enjoyed the praise his report received
from leading defense scientists in Canada,
Britain, and the United States. He was par-
ticularly pleased by the response of A. N.
Richards, who complimented him on his
comprehensive analysis of Russian defense
medicine and who gave his support to the
creation of "an American-British medical
liaison office in Moscow." Richards also
agreed with Penfield that it would be "ap-
pallingly difficult" to extend medical and
scientific assistance to China, although he
did suggest that they discuss this situation
the next time Penfield came to Washington
(Richards 1943).
Praise for Penfield's exploits also came
from another source: pro-Soviet organiza-
tions. In Canada, the most dynamic group
was the National Council of Canadian Soviet
Friendship (NCSCF), which, since its for-
mation in June 1943, had established chap-
ters in every major Canadian city, created its
own national journal, and established a series
of liaison committees. After the NCSCF
published a glowing account of the Russian
surgical mission, Penfield agreed to become a
member of its Science and Medical Com-
mittee, with a mandate to communicate
with Soviet scientists (Avery 1998: 217-222).
Another of Penfield's suitors was the Ameri-
can-Soviet Medical Society, organized in
February 1943 by two prominent medical
"progressives": Henry Sigerist and Walter
Cannon. Their goal was to facilitate medical
exchanges between the two countries by en-
couraging reciprocal visits, by exchanging
medical periodicals, and by translating and
publishing articles by Russian doctors in the
American Review of Soviet Medicine. During
the next 5 years, the Review regularly popu-
larized the achievements of Soviet medical
"stars" such as surgeons Nikolai Burdenko,
Alexander Smirnov, Sergei Yudin, and the
physiologist Lena Stem.
Interest in Soviet medicine increased in the
fall of 1943 when the OSRD announced that
it was planning to send a second contingent
of medical experts to Moscow, this time un-
der the leadership of Dr. Baird Hastings,
professor of biological chemistry at the
Harvard Medical School, assisted by Dr.
Michael Shimkin, a Russian-speaking mem-
ber of the U.S. Public Health Service. The
Hastings mission was in many ways a logical
extension of the previous surgical mission,
the major difference being its extended terms
ofreference-a position that Penfield had con-
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tinually stressed in his letters to Richards and
Vannevar Bush. By December 1943, 10 spe-
cialized medical reports, exemplifying the best
of Allied collaborative research, were ready
for delivery to the Russians: 1, "British Anti-
Lewisite (BAL)" by Milton Winternitz; 2,
"Typhus Vaccine" by Norman Topping et
al.; 3, "Plasma Protein Fractionalism" by
Baird Hastings and Edwin Cohn; 4, "Quina-
crine Treatment of Malaria" by James A.
Cannon; 5, "Surgical Problems-Wounds,
Burns, Shock" by Allen Whipple; 6, "In-
secticides" by W. E. Dove; 7, "Air Steriliza-
tion" by O. H. Robertson; 8, "Treatment of
Fungus Infections" by J. Gardner Hopkins;
9, "Goggles for Military Use" by Walter
Miles; 10, "Penicillin" by Robert Coghill and
Chester Keefer (Richards 1943).
American motives for this mission were
not entirely altruistic. Although Richards
and Bush expected their reports to aid Soviet
defense medicine and improve relations be-
tween the two countries, they also wanted
something in return. More specifically, they
wanted detailed information about specific
Russian medical innovations-notably, the
treatment of frostbite, Arctic warfare cloth-
ing and equipment, the treatment of bacillary
dysentery, protection against German chem-
ical weapons, and the treatment of battle
exhaustion.
Before the Hastings mission could be
launched, the Americans had to ensure that
their Canadian and British partners agreed to
release data for these 10 medical reports. On
14 July, James Conant, assistant director of
OSRD, wrote Mackenzie of the NRC, re-
questing permission to use this material and
inviting the Canadians to join the Moscow
mission. It was an easy sell. Mackenzie
quickly approved both suggestions, although
he did suggest that a suitable British scientist
should represent the Commonwealth (Mac-
kenzie 1943). By contrast, the British response
was neither friendly nor accommodating.
What was the point, asked Edward Mellanby
of the Medical Research Council, in having
yet another United Nations medical mission
to Moscow if they could not speak freely
with Soviet researchers and if the Kremlin
was not prepared to reciprocate with useful
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information. Although he conceded that the
Soviets might "more greatly value a mission
to deal with medical discoveries than one of
practical surgeons," he remained noncom-
mittal as to whether or not a British delegate
would accompany Baird Hastings (Mellanby
1943).
The summer of 1943 was not a happy time
in Anglo-American military and scientific
relations. There were bitter recriminations
from Britain, arising from its exclusion from
the early stages of the Manhattan Project,
despite the fact that British scientists had
pioneered nuclear techniques and had shared
information with the Americans during the
three previous years (Sherwin 1977). Similar
tensions were present in medical research,
where the propensity of American scientists
to glorify their own medical achievements,
and minimize British contributions, caused
much ill will. This was particularly the case
in the development of penicillin, where How-
ard Florey's research team had been in the
vanguard in proving that this "magic mould"
could dramatically reduce battlefield infec-
tions once it had been isolated, purified,
mass produced, and clinically applied. By
1943, however, the production of penicillin
was dominated by the giant American drug
companies, with the CMR and the American
military receiving most of the product, while
Florey's team remained outside the distribu-
tion loop (Macfarlane 1979).
This situation enraged Florey, who felt
betrayed by his American partners and who
regarded future cooperation with U.S. scien-
tists with reservations. "With regard to peni-
cillin," he wrote Mellanby in September
1943, "the whole business ... is so much
wrapped up with propaganda and personal,
institutional, governmental, and interna-
tional nature that it horrifies me.... We have
evidence ... that the Russians think penicillin
was an American discovery. You would
know better than I whether any active steps
should be taken to disillusion the Russians on
this subject" (Florey 1943). Within a month,
however, Mellanby managed to convince
Florey to represent British medical science in
Moscow by playing upon his patriotism, his
professional pride, and his sense of adven-
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ture: "I have difficulty in believing that Baird
Hastings could speak with very much au-
thority on the subject of penicillin in relation
to wound treatment. ... I expect you would
have an interesting time in Russia, and I am
sure they would do you well, especially in
view of the improved political relation be-
tween the two countries (Mellanby 1943).
When Florey did proceed to Moscow in Jan-
uary 1944, he represented both British and
Canadian medical science.
Florey was delighted with the openness of
Soviet medical scientists, by the cooperative
attitude of government officials, and by the
fact that his penicillin work was so highly re-
garded. He was also intrigued with the po-
tential of the Russian penicillin mold P.
crustosum, which provided different results
than the P. notatum mold used by Western
scientists, and which reinforced his view that
British and Soviet penicillin experts should
expand their collaborative research. As a re-
sult, when he returned to Britain, Florey
made sure that "documents relating ... to the
clinical application of penicillin and wound
treatment in general" were regularly for-
warded to his contacts at the All-Union In-
stitute of Experimental Medicine in Moscow
(Florey 1944).
Florey's relations with Hastings and the
CMR hierarchy also improved. This was re-
flected in the cooperative approach each side
adopted in preparing their reports, which
were remarkably similar in content and
focus. Both praised the same Soviet military
medical discoveries and innovations, particu-
larly in the field of antibiotics, where P.
crustosum-based penicillin, typhus vaccines,
and new uses for atabrine in the treatment of
malaria received special mention. The Rus-
sian blood supply system, which only con-
verted 20% into serum or plasma, was simi-
larly praised, as were Russian methods of
dealing with shock, burns, and wounds. In
addition, the Hastings report mentioned
secret Soviet research on the treatment of
cancer tumors.
Where the two reports most differed was
in their assessment of future developments in
Soviet medicine. Florey remained cautious,
but Hastings boldly predicted that a new era
had arrived where "the administration of
Soviet Science is in the hands of scientists and
most of the important decisions emanate
from scientists and their organizations rather
than from the government." He also ex-
pressed confidence that the imminent Soviet
medical mission to the United States, led by
Professor V. V. Parin, deputy commissar of
public health, would greatly impress Ameri-
can medical experts. To further expand the
exchange, Hastings argued for the creation of
a third American mission to Russia, carrying
even more important medical secrets (Has-
tings 1944).
THE END OF SOVIET-ALLIED MEDICAL
COOPERAnON
The Florey-Hastings Mission represented
the high point of Western-Soviet wartime
scientific interaction. Its success reflected a
legacy of international cooperation among
medical practitioners that predated the war
and the parallel contribution of other forms
of Allied assistance, notably U.S. Lend Lease
and the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Technical Ac-
cord. But the most compelling reasons for its
success were political and military. What
mattered most to Washington and London,
at that stage in the war, was Moscow's sup-
port in defeating Nazi Germany and Imperi-
al Japan and in creating the United Nations.
That did not mean, however, that such pri-
orities would remain once the war had ended.
Indeed, there were many indications before
August 1945 that many prominent Allied
leaders regarded the postwar goals of their
Soviet ally with suspicion.
This transition in trust was clearly evident
in reports sent by Averill Harriman, U.S.
ambassador in Moscow, on the merits of
other medical exchanges. In 1944, Harriman
had only good things to say about the
Florey-Hastings mission, and he advised
Vannevar Bush that "in our overall relations
with the Soviets ... the trip has been of real
value." Bush added his endorsement in a
memorandum on Soviet-U.S. cooperation to
President Roosevelt on 12 April 1944: "Since
the Russians reciprocated in full measure,"
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Bush wrote, "I am confident that the military
medicine programs of both countries will
benefit materially" (Bush 1944). With their
president's blessing, American scientific and
military officials tried to meet Soviet de-
mands for additional medical supplies and
advanced technical information. In late April
1944, for example, 3 billion Oxford units of
penicillin, produced by the Charles Pfizer
Company, were sent to Moscow under Lend
Lease. Western medical journals were ship-
ped to Russian researchers, as well as labo-
ratory equipment and quantities of first aid
supplies. At home, U.S. authorities showed
every courtesy to visiting Soviet representa-
tives, such as Professor Lebedenko, who was
allowed to attend medical meetings of the
OSRD and the NRC and to visit high-
security medical laboratories.
By January 1945, however, Harriman had
serious reservations about Soviet political
and military intentions, a scepticism that
prompted him to reassess u.S.-USSR medi-
cal liaison arrangements. Now, he opposed
plans for a third American medical mission
to Moscow on the grounds that the Kremlin
had failed to deliver on its promise to send a
high-profile delegation of Russian scientists
to North America. He also questioned
whether the OSRD was "receiving as de-
tailed data on current Russian research as it
is supplying to the Russians" (Harriman
1945). Significantly, this negative message
coincided with a major U.S. reassessment of
Soviet intentions in eastern Europe, par-
ticularly in Poland. Even more important,
American military planners now concluded
that Japan's defeat would not require Red
Army assistance: instead, U.S. atomic bombs
would finish the job.
With the end of the war, the institutional
basis for cooperation between the Western
Allies and the USSR was fundamentally al-
tered. This change in priorities was evident in
late 1945 when the U.S. government cur-
tailed its commitments to Lend Lease and to
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Agency. Revelations of Soviet espionage, and
the breakdown of negotiations over nuclear
arms control, drove the two sides even fur-
ther apart (Avery 1998). By 1947, the Cold
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War saw a breakdown in communication
between Western and Soviet medical re-
searchers. In the name of national security,
Russian scientists were subjected to strict
political control and police intimidation;
they also had to deal with the resurgence of
Lysenkoism, which glorified all Russian dis-
coveries, real or imagined (Holloway 1994).
At the same time, some Western scientists
who had pro-Soviet wartime attitudes found
themselves the target of red-baiters. Al-
though this hysteria ebbed after the death of
Josef Stalin and the end of the Korean War,
medical cooperation never came close to the
levels achieved between 1943 and 1946 (Kre-
mentsov 1997, Avery 1998).
CONCLUSION
What was the legacy of wartime Soviet-
Allied medical cooperation? Did both sides
obtain valuable knowledge from this ex-
change? Was it a high point in the wartime
liaison between these wartime partners or
just a brief interlude in mutually enforced
isolation?
For those involved, such as Wilder Pen-
field, Howard Florey, and Baird Hastings,
there was the satisfaction of knowing that
they had been involved in undertakings of
great importance. From their perspective,
they had helped save lives, reinforce the alli-
ance with the Soviet Union, and foster inter-
national cooperation. Certainly in the case of
Penfield, diary entries confirm that his 1943
surgical mission to Russia and China, as well
as his subsequent advisory role in establish-
ing the formalized medical liaison system,
were high points of his wartime experience
(Lewis 1981).
Did the Soviet-Allied medical exchange
system really produce any major innovations
that helped reduce battlefield fatalities and
substantially advance medical knowledge? If
one uses the reports of three missions, the
answer would be a qualified yes, with the
most enthusiastic endorsement coming from
Baird Hastings. Because official records of
the Soviet medical organizations are not
readily available, it is difficult to know how
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the Russian experts regarded the results of
the exchange, although their wartime ac-
counts, published by the American Review of
Soviet Medicine (1943), suggest an affirma-
tive response.
The Second World War was a unique pe-
riod of interaction between Western and So-
viet medical scientists, which inspired hope
for the postwar world. The legacy of the ex-
perience was aptly summarized by Henry Si-
gerist in an editorial deploring the advent of
the Cold War: "The medical profession is the
world's greatest fraternity: wherever a doctor
goes he is welcomed by his fellow doctors.
International meetings, excursions of physi-
cians to foreign lands, and wide ranging co-
operative study of disease by medical experts
attest the universality of our professional in-
terest and the community of our efforts....
The United States and the USSR are two
great countries in which medical science is
making great strides, two countries that have
the brains and the means to carry out re-
search on a vast scale. It would be perfectly
foolish to ignore the research of the other
country's work" (Sigerist 1947).
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